| Simon Chapman Ph.D.
Associate Professor Department of Public Health and Community Medicine |
Sonia Wutzke BSc (Psych) Hons
Department of Psychological Medicine University of Sydney 2006 |
Published in Australian & New Zealand Journal of Public Health 1997;21:614-20
In August 1995, a major story was covered for over two weeks by all news media in Sydney, Australia, and in several outlets elsewhere in Australia. The story concerned a protest by a group of residents supported by local politicians over the installation of a mobile telephone transmitter base station adjacent to a suburban kindergarten in the middleclass Sydney beachside suburb of Harbord. A few weeks before (July 10), Australia’s leading investigative journalism TV program, Four Corners, had run a program examining the question of whether radiofrequency radiation (RFR) from mobile phones posed health risks to users.
Australia, with over two million current users in a population of 18 million people,1 has the world’s second highest per capita use of mobile phones after Norway. The market is currently worth $A3.5 billion and rapidly expanding, with predictions of eight million users by the year 2000.2 This phenomenal explosion in mobile phone use, together with the cautionary note sounded by the Four Corners program, fomented a time-honoured news frame that would have immediately marked the story as newsworthy via the sub-text of “danger in the familiar” and a news judgement that many, owning mobile phones, would find the story personally relevant.3 Previous media questioning along the same theme of potential cancer risks from ordinary household electrical equipment (microwave ovens, computer screens, electric blankets) would have reinforced a general community wariness about health risks arising from new electrical technology. Discourse analysts refer to this process as intertextual referencing.4
As will be seen, the protest was covered almost entirely sympathetically by the news media, by callers to talkback radio and by those who wrote letters to the press. With momentary exceptions, all media coverage inhabited the same definition of the issue assumed by the protesters: that the residents were quite understandably concerned about their children’s health, were engaged in a classic David vs Goliath struggle, and were pursuing justice. Accordingly, when Telstra, the telecommunications provider involved, capitulated and dismantled the facility, their action was described repeatedly by newsreaders and journalists as a “victory” to “people power.”
As a big news story, the dynamics of this story are prima facie sociologically interesting as a case study in newsworthiness. But as will be argued, the actual risk posed by the transmitters was by most authoritative accounts, infinitesimally small. This made the story interesting from a second perspective: what were the characteristics of this issue that enabled a situation which posed health risks that were almost certainly infinitesimal, to be regarded by residents as worthy of impassioned action and the attention of the media?
Mobile phones emit low levels of RFR, but at levels well below limits recommended in US and Australian standards.5 Digital mobile phones have been found to interfere with the functioning of sensitive medical electrical equipment6 and many people visiting hospitals would have been exposed to signs requesting that phones be switched off. As with most studies that have examined the health consequences of exposure to electromagnetic radiation (EMR), studies about exposure to RFR have mostly been confined to groups such as radio operators who are occupationally exposed to RFR at close range often over long periods. Such studies, including two from Australia,7, 8 have produced conflicting conclusions9, 10,
11 about the risks of such close-range exposure.
A 1991 review of evidence on the potential health hazards of the radiofrequency portion of the EMR spectrum (between 0.5 MHz and 100 GHz) stated that: “there are no unequivocal pathophysiologic changes in humans exposed to levels up to 4 W kg-1.”12 A 1995 review stated:
Our emphases (italicised above) indicate that this remains a field of medical research where the equivocal language of scientific uncertainty is de rigeur. As will be shown, this uncertainty factor was of critical importance to an understanding of the protest against the towers.
Following a request by the residents, measurements carried out by the government’s Australian Radiation Laboratory showed that the maximum exposure level at ground level in the Harbord kindergarten was 239 times below that recommended by the relevant Australian standard, AS2772.1 and “almost 12,000 times below the threshold where RFR effects become discernible.”14 The report concluded that the radio frequency exposure levels encountered at the kindergarten “did not present a hazard to people of any age” — an emphasis carried in Telstra’s press releases. (Telstra media release, 18th August 1995).
So if there was any health risk (ie: actual hazard) associated with exposure to the REF emitting from the Telstra towers, it would have been an exceedingly small risk — and certainly one incomparably smaller than many risks voluntarily undertaken everyday by many urban residents15 such as driving cars, crossing roads, and smoking.
Sandman17, 18   argues that the idea of risk needs to be reconceptualised to take account of the relationship between the risky situation or agent (which he names the “hazard”) and the strength of people’s responses to these situations. These responses are mediated by the extent to which these agents or situations “outrage” communities. Risk is thus a product of the actual hazard plus a community’s outrage at their perception of that hazard. He argues:
Sandman, building on the work of Covello, von Winterfeldt and Slovic20 has delineated twelve principle outrage components (see Table 1) that influence whether or not a situation is perceived as safe or risky.
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In addition to these twelve principal components Sandman identifies a further eight considerations which he suggests influence people’s perception of risk over safety (see Table 2). Without specifying why he considers these to be “additional” factors, the impression is gained that these are not as fundamental to the prediction of community outrage. Again, a situation will tend to be perceived as more risky if:
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Our intention in this paper is, through discourse analysis,21 to apply these principal components of Sandman’s model of risk perception to the record of media coverage of this episode. On request, Telstra supplied us with all press reports (n=14), radio transcripts (n=11) and TV video recordings of news items (n=7) concerned with the issue. Both authors independently reviewed these materials and attempted to categorise all examples of news discourse against the oppositions in Tables 1 and 2. Our respective efforts were then brought together, disagreements in categorisation reviewed and residual aspects of the news coverage that did not appear consonant with Sandman’s categories set aside. This latter group are considered in our discussion section at the end of this paper.
In the discussion that follows, we consider each of Sandman’s components of outrage against the media coverage of the issue. We provide examples of media discourse that illustrate each component. We have italicised passages for emphasis.
A major theme in the Harbord protest was that Telstra was said to have ridden roughshod over community interests and imposed the towers on the community. Close to 100% of media reports framed the situation as a protest against an imposition.
Mobile phone transmission antennae appear anything but natural. As new technology, resplendent with acronymic risk language (EMR, RFR), these artifices combined with the commercial and business nature of the mega-industrial Telstra company would appear to readily satisfy Sandman’s industrial criterion.
Being relatively new to Australian communities, the towers attracted concern while other industrial long established sources of EMR emissions in the same community went unchallenged. For example, an electricity substation located at ground level opposite the kindergarten and passed by hundreds of pedestrians each day was ignored by the protesters. The substation was familiar while mobile phone towers, being new and more "exotic", were inherently suspicious.
Rapidly sprouting like some post nuclear holocaust cacti or "hydra-headed monsters"22 throughout urban environments, the imposing structures of mobile phone towers together with their rapid proliferation throughout suburban communities would appear to satisfy this criterion in Sandman’s model. However, we found no references in the media discourse on this dispute to any aspect of the appearance of the towers.
Close to 100% of the transcripts and videotapes reiterated concerns of fear and horror. Whether current or potential, the residents were adamant that there was something they were entitled to be afraid of. “Radiation” is a word as loaded with dread as any in the language, connoting the horrors of nuclear power station accidents and nuclear bomb testing.
Research indicates that people fear low probability, high magnitude risk (eg: airline crashes) more than high probability, low magnitude risk (eg:routine car travel). We found nothing in the media discourse on this episode to suggest that the community believed that there would be some huge and sudden epidemic of radiation-induced illness throughout their community. While the protesters were outraged, concern about a catastrophe was not evident among a general concern for health consequences. Consequently we believe this component of Sandman’s model was not applicable to the nature of outrage evinced in this episode.
One of the most consistent themes emerging from the news reports highlighted the lack of knowledge and availability of evidence concerning the “true” facts associated with the situation. Despite Telstra’s recourse to expert consensus opinion (it cited a WHO report on EMR11) and to the independent readings it obtained from the Australian Radiation Laboratories, it was unable to give an absolute assurance that there was no risk — a concept that is scientifically nonsensical. Because mobile phones and their transmission towers are so recent, epidemiological knowledge about any long-term health consequences of chronic low level RFR exposure from mobile phone towers has not been gathered, consequently resulting in an “unknowable” prognosis for the those presently exposed.
Ulrich Beck has argued that with increasing modernisation, external, tangible dangers once readily identifiable in face-to-face communities have become supplanted in human preoccupations by a host of covert risks characterised by uncertainty — chronic, slow-acting risks that lurk in familiar objects and environments we live in.23 The pervasiveness of concern about risks in modern society, Beck argues, is a metaphor for the growing feeling of lack of control in people’s lives.
Throughout the majority of transcripts a theme emerged of honest, plain-speaking residents banging their discontents on the unyielding doors of a huge corporation intent on going in its self-interested direction. It was beyond the ability of any of the protesters to move the facility themselves — this would have to occur through the actions of Telstra. Their protestations about health risk were rebuffed by the science and testing being wielded by Telstra. Rather than being given access to personal radio frequency power metres so they might control the measurement of RFR from the towers, the residents were given the substitute of readings provided by an agent appointed by Telstra.
Repeatedly, news reports commented on the unjustness of the situation. Innocent victims, young children and decent residents trying to maintain a safe suburban community were being taken advantage of by an industrial communications giant.
When considering high outrage-inducing situations, communities are not satisfied with partial solutions, reassurances or targets. For example, it is inconceivable that a police chief would promise a community to reduce child molestation by half — only a commitment to total eradication would be considered morally acceptable, despite being utopian. “Radiation” is a word that is charged with a high moral valency. Anyone attempting to argue for even an acceptable amount of radiation next to a school would face certain hostility from parents. The protesters were demanding that the unobtainable no risk must be the only acceptable standard. Neither Telstra, nor anyone, could oblige.
Telstra appeared to realise early in the dispute that its own assurances on safety were to the protesters, bereft of credibility. They arranged for the Australian Radiation Laboratory to test the emissions. The technician was shown on television bulletins summarising his findings of negligible risk described earlier. Sandman comments that when people mistrust a company or agency, they pay little respect or attention to the data or standards offered by the company or agency. In this instance, the protesters responded by “shifting the goalposts” of what they would consider acceptable risk.
Many reports suggested a perception that Telstra was arrogant and unresponsive to community concerns and by extension, hiding something. If they were unforthcoming and unresponsive, the implication for the community was that the risk must be unacceptable.
Part 1: Abstract
Background
Risk = Hazard + Outrage
Primary Components
Part 2: Secondary Components
Telstra’s response to outrage
Discussion
Postscript
Part 3: Appendix 1: Bibliography
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Peter M. Sandman
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Phone: 1-609-683-4073
Fax: 1-609-683-0566 Email: peter@psandman.com |
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